Midterm

October 14, 2019, 10:10–11:00 AM $\,$

There are five problems each worth five points for a total of 25 points. Show all your work, partial credit will be awarded. A blue book is provided for your work. Put your name on the blue book, sign it and return it with the test. No notes, no collaboration.

Name: _____

Problem	Credit
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
Total	

1. Vigenere key extraction

The Vigenere cipher was not created with chosen plaintext attacks in mind.

 \star Given a Vigenere cipher with an unknown key, explain how, with a single chosen plaintext, you can discover the key.

Note: We have it from a very reliable source (who is now in prison for fraud and witness tampering) that the key is never longer than 10 characters.

Also, there is no need to disambiguate between keys such as "ab" versus "abab".

2. Conditional probabilities

A desperate message goes out to an operative to bring home a necessary grocery for dinner. By previous "intel" (intelligence), Q has informed us that the probability of each grocery is:

Pr[m]	$\mid m$
2/16	apple
4/16	butter
2/16	carrot
1/16	eggs
1/16	lettuce
1/16	pear
2/16	pepper
3/16	tomato

While shoulder surfing, counter-intelligence (spies that spy on spies) learns that the message that was sent has 6 letters in it.

 \star What is the new probability for each of the 8 messages given this conditioning event C,

$Pr[m \mid C]$	$\mid m$
	apple
	butter
	carrot
	eggs
	lettuce
	pear
	pepper
	tomato

3. Protocol flaws and message forgery

Cryptographic expert Ive Gonetovish has created a combined encryption and authentication scheme for an authenticated encryption.

However, he doubts whether it is necessary to have separate keys for the encryption and the authentication. After a light lunch consisting a turkey sandwich, a salad, french fries, two slices of pecan pie and a diet coke, he comes back from lunch and unwisely decides to use just one key for both. Then he falls asleep under his desk.

You must show him that this decision was a mistake — to use only one key, not that he had a diet coke.

The encryption is CBC with a randomly chosen IV, using the AES block cipher. The authentication is a CBC-MAC also using the AES cipher.

 \star Show how you can use a chosen plaintext attack to create a (m, t) message tag pair which verifies for a message that was never signed

4. Probabilistic Polynomial Time Algorithms

There are two ways to think about the non-determinism of a PPT.

In one, a device delivers a random bit on request. In the other, there is a pre-drawn sequence of random bits, and the next bit in the sequence is delivered on request. The difference is that the pre-drawn sequence can run out of bits during the algorithm's run but the device delivering bits on request will not run out.

However, this difference is unimportant and the two models are precisely equivalent.

 \star Show how to create a pre-drawn sequence that, while finite, is guaranteed to be long enough for any computation of the PPT, given our security parameter n.

5. Forgery Attack Models for Canonical Verification

A MAC consists of a PPT Gen(n) that generates proper length keys; a PPT Mac(k,m) that calculates the tag from the key and the message; and a deterministic polynomial time algorithm Vrfy(k,m,t) that verifies the messsage-tag pair, given the key, message and tag.

The canonical verification is when Vrfy is equal to:

def Vrfy(k,m,t):
return t==Mac(k,m)

In our forgery game we gave the adversary oracle access to the Mac function to make test tags on messages of its choosing.

 \star Show that if canonical verification is used, the adversary can also be given oracle access to the Vrfy function to test messsage-tag pairs of its choosing, and this will not change the adversary's power.

Hint: You have to make a general argument that works for any adversary. I suggest you consider how, for this special sort of Vrfy, an adversary wishing to have a verify oracle can build it for itself from the oracles it already has.

Full credit needs to explain not only how to build the oracle, but how it gets used.